THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION AND ITS OBJECTS

Abstract

This manuscript discusses whether there is merely a semantic or terminological divergence in the concepts of education and pedagogy, sometimes used (arbitrarily) as synonyms, caused by a praxist view of education, in which pedagogical practice is overvalued to the detriment of its scientific nature in the study of the educational phenomenon. It proposes reflection on the divergence in the inflection of the word "science," in the singular or plural, which will imply the acceptance—or not—of the multiplicity of objects of education as a science. Finally, based on Kelsen's proposal of a "pure," unbiased legal science, the manuscript seeks to raise concerns about a fallacious attempt to present the science of education in isolation, unaffected by the fluctuations of pedagogical knowledge. The object of the science of education is the starting and finishing point of this reflection, understanding that the intervention of other sciences in the investigation of its object of study positively contributes to its understanding and identification, in which such fluctuations require only methodological rigor in the research process to avoid contaminating the results. It follows that to maintain otherwise would imply advocating for a pure science of education, in which its object, as Hans Kelsen intended for law, must be free of other elements that, instead of contributing to the result, contaminate it.